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We report the results of a new public goods experiment with an intra-group cooperation
dilemma and inter-group competition. In our design subjects receive information about
their relative individual and group performance after each round with non-incentivized
and then incentivized group competition. We found that, on average, individuals with low
relative performance reduce their contributions to the public good, but groups with low
performance increase theirs. With incentivized competition, where the relative ranking
of the group increases individual payoffs, the reaction to relative performance is larger
with individuals contributing more to the group; further, we observe that the variance
of strategies decreases as individual and group rankings increase. These results offer
new insights on how social comparison shapes similar reactions in games with different
incentives for group performance and how competition and cooperation can influence
each other.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Collective action most likely evolved as a survival group strategy
to overcome challenges and threats difficult to surpass individ-
ually. Achieving collective action, however, requires solving the
problem of incentives within the group, namely, the conflict
among individuals who would be better materially if they reap
the benefits of cooperation by others but do not assume the cost.
Groups with higher levels of cooperation, on the other hand,
could reproduce their strategies more successfully making them
more competitive against other groups. This competition among
groups over scarce resources decreases the within-group conflict
at the cost of raising the between-group conflict1.
One particular condition shaping competition is the availabil-
ity of information on individual and group performance. When
these informational sets are independently provided, the feed-
back at the group level decreases the salience of selfish incentives,
increasing within-group cooperation (Burton-Chellew and West,
2012) at the cost of additional between-group conflict. However,
subjects’ reaction to the simultaneous provision of individual and
group ranking has been rather unexplored. By receiving simul-
taneous feedback on individual and group performance subjects
may develop richer responses to their relative success with respect
to other group members but also to their group’s success with
respect to other groups, especially in presence of competition for
additional resources. These different incentives bring a complex
interaction of cooperation and conflict. One individual’s higher
1The study of multi-level selection has been witnessing a revival in natural
and social sciences. See for instance (Sloan Wilson and Wilson, 2007; Bowles
and Gintis, 2011).
relative performance could increase her individual payoffs at the
expense of reducing the relative performance of her group, and
thus harming the group’s relative performance which in turn
would decrease her individual payoffs.
The earliest experimental evidence from the effects of inter-
group competition, including the development of in-group and
out-group dimensions and the increase of cooperativeness (resp.
hostility) with subjects from the same (resp. the other) group,
comes from the “Robber’s Cave” experiment described in Sherif
et al. (1954/1961). Incentivized experiments with a game theoret-
ical foundation appear years after, showing that between-group
competition reduces the within-group conflict and positively
affect the cooperation levels (Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987;
Bornstein, 1992; Erev et al., 1993; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef,
1994). In this second wave of experiments on group competi-
tion the term “discontinuity effect” was coined, meaning that
the interactions between two unitary groups are more competi-
tive than the interactions between two individuals (Schopler and
Insko, 1992). These advances in the empirical literature were
accompanied by theoretical models describing the conditions in
which cooperation may emerge under a scenario of between-
group competition for a share of the resource jointly produced
(Hausken, 1995, 2000)2.
Bornstein’s empirical work was followed by new experiments
involving between-group competition in contest games and
2For instance in Hausken (2000), cooperative behavior might be sustained
if the two groups are sufficiently closer in their initial cooperation levels,
otherwise the less cooperative group does not have incentives to engage in
competition.
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public goods games3, both characterized by a tension between
collective and individual incentives. In contest games, fixed
groups compete for a reward to be allocated based on the rela-
tive investments in the contest (Abbink et al., 2012; Leibbrandt
and Saaksvuori, 2012). As the investments are dissipated after the
prize allocation, the socially desirable contributions to the contest
are minimal.
When between-group competition is embedded in a public
goods game the within-group conflict is reduced at the cost of
an increased salience of between-group conflict. Contributions
provide a benefit to all group members, including the contrib-
utor, which is smaller than the benefit of not contributing. As the
between-group conflict is not inherent to the conventional pub-
lic goods game, such dimension is introduced through rewards
based on group performance. For the different rules used in
the studies below, individual contributions are positively affected
by competition. In Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and
Burton-Chellew et al. (2010) groups compete for additional mon-
etary units (MUs). In the former, a unique prize is shared evenly
or proportionally across treatments. In the latter, multiple prizes
are offered, ranging from 80% of the endowment for the top per-
former, to 10% of the endowment for the bottom performer. In
Tan and Bolle (2007) two groups compete based on their aggre-
gate contributions for a higher return rate of the common fund.
In Puurtinen and Mappes (2009) two out of six groups are ran-
domly drawn each round to compete. All competitors receive
twice the difference of the aggregate contribution of each group, a
positive transfer for the winners deducted from the losers’ payoffs.
In Reuben and Tyran (2010) groups compete for being ranked
first, a position that may be simultaneously reached by all groups.
Groups below the first place face a reduction of their payoffs pro-
portional to their ranking position. Burton-Chellew and West
(2012) claim that, as a consequence of the long-term group selec-
tion process, people react to cues of competition in the absence
of material benefits. In a public goods experiment they provide
information on the between-group performance to the treat-
ment group and information on the within-group performance
to a control group. Their findings indicate that contributions are
larger after receiving between-group’s feedback. In Markussen
et al. (2014) the group ranked first receives a transfer from
the group ranked last (with the group in-between having unal-
tered payoffs). Subjects collectively decide whether to introduce
competition or not using two different electoral rules: absolute
majority or group veto. Once again, competition increases contri-
bution levels. Although this rule is very likely to be elected under
the majority rule, it is implemented less than half of the times
under group veto. In most of the public goods games with group
competition subjects are randomly rematched after each interac-
tion. The exceptions are Reuben and Tyran (2010) andMarkussen
et al. (2014) who hold the groups’ composition constant; and (Tan
and Bolle, 2007), who introduce group competition using both
matching protocols.
3The standard voluntary contribution mechanism has been extensively used
in the exploration of other-regarding preferences. Two surveys of the relevant
literature in public good games are Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011).
For a meta-analysis see Zelmer (2003).
The increase in the salience of between-group competition
does not necessarily modify the equilibrium of the game, under
the assumption of players that maximize only their personal
material payoffs. The most evident case is Burton-Chellew et al.
(2010), where only the informational sets vary between treat-
ments. But in Tan and Bolle (2007) and Puurtinen and Mappes
(2009) null contribution is also the only equilibrium despite the
incentives to compete. In Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006);
Burton-Chellew et al. (2010) and Markussen et al. (2014) the a
positive contribution level (lower than the endowment) becomes
the unique equilibrium of the game. Finally, in Reuben and Tyran
(2010) null contribution and full contribution are equilibria of
the game.
We propose an experimental design where N subjects, divided
in fixed groups of size N/6, play a repeated public goods game
within the group while they compete against other groups for a
ranking position mapping in a payoffs’ multiplier. The unique
symmetric equilibrium in our game is full contribution. We want
to explore how the relative standing or ranking of individuals
within groups and the ranking of one’s group relative to other
groups matter for changing behavior. In our setting players know
their relative performance both individually and as a group. In
the first stage individuals learn about their relative performance,
individually and group wise, but payoffs are not affected. In
the second stage, besides informing them of their relative per-
formance, the players’ payoffs are multiplied by a factor μ that
increases linearly with the position of their group in the ranking.
Subjects in the bottom three groups see their payoffs reduced,
whereas those subjects in the top three groups see their payoffs
increased. The intensity of between-group competition shifts the
game theoretical Nash prediction from zero contributions to the
public good to full cooperation. The efficiency of the symmet-
ric equilibrium makes this institution, at least in theory, ex ante
attractive if it is assumed that all subjects are equally likely to
perform under incentivized competition. In practice, it allows
exploring heterogeneous beliefs and responses to competition
because downward deviations are rational only if subjects believe
that all the groups are not equally competitive. We also explore
the role of group size under the hypothesis that the likelihood to
coordinate and the salience of between-group conflict are higher
for smaller groups.
In this paper we contribute to the group competition lit-
erature in two different fronts. First, by exploring in detail
the informational effects of individual and group performance
on between-group competition. We find that while the rela-
tive group standing in the previous round decreased current
cooperation (i.e., lower contributions), the relative individual
standing had the opposite effect. Second, by showing that these
informational effects are structurally similar with or without
additional material incentives to compete. The only difference
is that the intercept is shifted upwards (i.e., toward higher con-
tribution levels) when the payoffs are affected by the group’s
ranking.
These results show a complex dynamic regarding the problem
of between-group competition with intra-group cooperation, and
opens further questions regarding rewards at the individual and
group levels.
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2. METHODS
The experiment was conducted between September and
November 2012 at Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá, Colombia)
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Informed consent was
obtained from all the participants, who were recruited through
email solicitations. Due to the low-risk nature of this exper-
iment, the voluntary participation of subjects, and the use
of a consent form signed by them, approval from the ethics
committee was not requested. However, the protocol followed
all ethical standars common in economic experiments. Each
session lasted between 70 and 90 min. Participants earned on
average $27,900 COP (Colombian pesos), about $15.3 usd,
including a show-up fee of $2000. This payment is about 1.5
times the Colombian minimum daily wage at the time of the
experiment4.
In each session, participants were divided into six groups to
play a voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) for twenty
rounds. We assigned players to groups of either 3, 4, or 5 people
and remained fixed during the whole session. Incentives includ-
ing group performance were introduced in the last ten rounds,
although information on individual and social comparison were
provided after each round for the entire session. Participants were
endowed with 10 tokens (e = 10) in each round. They had to
decide how many tokens they wanted to allocate in a common
fund (xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}), keeping the rest in a private fund.
Each token in the common fund had a payoff of $150 COP to
be divided equally among the group members, independently of
the individual contributions. Each token kept in the private fund
generated $100 COP to the individual player. This information
was known by all subjects.
At the end of each round participants were reminded of
their contribution, and were informed about their group’s aggre-
gate contribution, their round earnings, their individual ranking
among the whole population in the session (but not within their
group)5, their group ranking (based on aggregate earnings), and
the highest and lowest earnings of the round among all subjects
in the session.
The 20 rounds were divided into two stages of ten rounds each.
We will call the first stage pseudocompetition because payoffs are
not directly affected by the group’s ranking. In this stage, com-
prising rounds 1–10, we have a standard VCM payoffs function




with a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) in xi = 0.
In the competition stage, comprising rounds 11–20, earnings
are multiplied by a factor μ function of the group’s rank rk as
shown in Table 1. A multiplier μ = 2.0 is given to the best ranked
group, and it decreases linearly by a factor of 0.4 with each posi-
tion in the group ranking. In the case of a tie between two or more
41 USD = 1825 COP on November, 2012. Colombian daily minimum wage
was $18,890 COP in 2012.
5In Burton-Chellew and West (2012) the information of individual ranking
is given at the within-group level, along with the disaggregated individual
contributions.
Table 1 | Payoff multipliers according to group performance.
Group Ranking (rk) Bottom Top
1 2 3 4 5 6
Multiplier (μ) 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0










The entire payoffs function is multiplied byμ to hold constant the
ratio between the returns of the private and the common fund.
It prevents that contributing becomes increasingly attractive with
higher expectations of group performance. A similar incentive for
group performance is proposed in Reuben and Tyran (2010), with
multipliers that are used for punishing groups not able to rank
first. Under their conditions the game has two symmetric equilib-
ria: null contribution and full contribution. In our experimental
design the only symmetric NE is full contribution because the
multiplier rewards the “top performers” and punishes the “bot-
tom performers” simultaneously. To see why, consider that all
subjects are contributing x and thus all groups are tied (μ = 1.0).
A subject will have incentives to contribute an additional unit and
make her group rank first (μ = 2.0) if
2 (e − (x + 1) + α(nx + 1)) > (e − x) + αnx
which is strictly positive for every x ∈ {0, . . . , 9}. Once they reach
x = 10, any deviation will send the group to the bottom of
the ranking with a null multiplier, ratifying the lack of incen-
tives to deviate from x = 10. As in Reuben and Tyran (2010),
in our experimental setting the between-group incentives lead
to some asymmetric equilibria with different contribution lev-
els across groups. They appear when a single subject cannot alter
the group’s ranking given (her beliefs about) the other subjects’
actions. Consider a very simple case in which player i expects
that at least one of her group mates will not contribute her full
endowment, but she simultaneously expects that in all the other
groups subjects will behave as predicted in the symmetric equi-
librium (x = 10). This is equivalent to expect a multiplier μ = 0,
for which all the pure strategies turned out to be an equilibrium
of the game. Subjects from other groups, who are contributing
x = 10, do not have incentives to deviate unilaterally. Their cur-
rent payoff (1.2αne) is larger than what they could get by keeping
all their endowment and rank fifth as group (0.4(e + α(n − 1)e)),
the best scenario they could consider to defect.
Group size is an additional source of variation in our exper-
imental design. We hypothesize that smaller groups are more
reactive to the cues of between-group competition (and there-
fore that they will be closer to the NE under competition) for
two reasons: first, the intra-group coordination required to raise
the group’s relative performance might be, in theory, easier to
achieve (e.g., through simpler computations of intra-group and
inter-group beliefs); second, in smaller groups the salience of
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the within-group conflict might decrease more drastically with
competition.
Each unit in the common fund generated the same value irre-
spective of the group size. Therefore, the marginal per capita
return of the fund (MPCR) α depends then on the number of
participants in the session. We conducted two sessions with 3
players per group (α = 0.500), two sessions with 4 players per
group (α = 0.375), and another two sessions with 5 players per
group (α = 0.300) for a total of 6 sessions and 144 subjects.
Instructions were given orally and in written form. The
instructions were followed by two examples on the board. The
protocol read to the participants is included in the online
Supplementary Material. After the tenth round new instructions
were given for the competition stage. The new instructions empha-
sized the ranking calculations and transformation of the payoffs.
A post experimental survey was conducted to collect data on par-
ticipants’ competitiveness and trustworthiness, as well as basic
demographics. The questions used to measure competitiveness
are shown in the online Supplementary Material.
3. RESULTS
3.1. COOPERATION WITH ANDWITHOUT MATERIAL INCENTIVES FOR
COMPETITION
In the pseudocompetition stage the average contribution was 3.4
tokens. We observe (see Figure 1) the decay typical of a stan-
dard linear PG game (Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003), ranging
from 4.5 tokens in round 1–2.4 tokens in round 10. As expected
from the theoretical predictions, contribution levels are higher
once the between-group competition is materially incentivized.
In the competition stage the average contribution is 7.3 tokens.
The increasing contribution rate, going from 6.1 tokens in round
11–7.7 tokens in round 20, suggests that subjects learn about the
incentives of the game with experience but they are still far from
the symmetric NE prediction.
We do not find an effect of group size, possibly because we
primed the total value of each token in the common fund (invari-
ant with group size) instead of priming the value of the MPCR
(which decreases with group size). We also find that the percent-
age of subjects following the NE x = 0 goes from 11% in round 1
to 36% in round 10. When the NE is x = 10 the increase of play-
ers following this strategy goes from 31% in round 11 to 55% in
round 20. The NE outcome under competition, i.e., maximum
contribution levels for all participants, did not emerge in any
round of any session. However, smaller groups were more likely
to maximize their total contribution to the common fund6 .
6With group size n = 5 only one group played the NE strategy for a single
round in the competition treatment. When the group size was n = 4 only one
group played the NE for four consecutive rounds (15–18). The NE strategy
was played more often with groups formed by three players: In one of the
sessions, in the last six rounds at least one group fully contributed (although it
was not always the same group). In round 20 four groups played this strategy.
In the other session, two groups played the NE eight times between rounds 12
and 20. A third group also played this strategy in round 14. For groups of three
players the deviation from the NE is less likely to occur than for bigger groups:
Only one of the five groups that reached the NE at least twice deviated from
full contribution more than once (and there was only one group that deviates
in a given round but rapidly corrected this mistake).
FIGURE 1 | Average contribution with and without group competition.
The gray horizontal line represent the Nash equilibrium of the game in the
pseudocompetition and the competition stages.
The fact that the Nash equilibrium is played more often with
material incentives for competition (39%) than without them
(21%) is not surprising since the most self-regarding and the
more cooperative subjects in the first stage react similarly to
incentivized competition, as is evidenced in Figure 2. A shift
in individualists’ cooperative behavior, triggered by intergroup
competition, is reported in Probst et al. (1999). Their test-based
measure of individualism (compared to collectivism) is correlated
with more contributions in a public goods game with intergroup
dependent payoffs7.
On the left panel of Figure 2 is observed that a small propor-
tion of subjects (5.6%) contribute more without than with incen-
tivized competition. We will call then the “non-competitors”
because we argue that this is due to their different preferences
for performing in a competitive environment (Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2013). For this small fraction of
non-competitors the proportion of women is much higher (50%
compared to 36% among the competitors, p-value 0.429), they are
much more likely to report that they prefer to play without than
with competition (75% compared to 33% among the competi-
tors, p-value 0.016), and they display less competitive attitudes
according to a standardized principal components index con-
structed using six questions responded in the post-experimental
survey (0.48 standard deviations less competitive, p-value 0.160).
However, the statistical tests are not very likely to result significant
given the low proportion of non-competitors.
3.2. RESPONSES TO FEEDBACK ON INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
PERFORMANCE
We show in Figure 3 the effect of feedback on group and individ-
ual performance in subsequent contribution decisions. A com-
parison of the four panels in this figure reveals the following
7We consider as individualistic subjects those with low contribution levels
(i.e., below the median) in the pseudocompetition stage. See the legend in
Figure 2 for more details.
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FIGURE 2 | Total contribution (per player) with and without competition.
Participants are classified according to the median average contribution
(x = 3) under pseudocompetition (rounds 1–10). The red circles represent
participants below the median (“low contributors”) and blue diamonds
represent participants above the median (“high contributors”). In the left
panel we plot the mean contribution per player under pseudocompetition vs.
the mean contribution under competition. For the “low contributors” the
correlation between the average contribution across the two stages is
negative and marginally significant (–0.21, p-value 0.092), whereas for the
“high contributors” this correlation is positive and significant (0.31, p-value
0.006). In the right panel we plot the contribution of each player in the first
round of each treatment showing again the opposite relationships for low and
high contributors (median contribution in round 1 is x = 4). Marker size
reflects the frequency of observations in each point of the grid.
three patterns: (i) Better group performance reduces individual
contributions, whereas better individual performance increases
individual contributions. (ii) The response to group performance
shifts upwards with incentivized competition and, as a conse-
quence, subjects in top-performing groups stop reducing their
contribution. On the other hand, the nonlinearity in the response
to individual performance becomes less pronounced with incen-
tivized competition. (iii) The variance of responses to feedback
on individual and group performance decreases with ranking
positions.
We use a fixed effects estimator (demeaned variables method)
to test patterns (i) and (ii) by regressing Contribution on indi-
vidual and group ranking’s in the quadratic polynomial form8.
This method allows us to control for unobserved time invari-
ant characteristics of the subjects. We observe the negative (and
decreasing) effect of group ranking as well as the positive (and
decreasing) effect of individual ranking before and after introduc-
ing material incentives to compete. We also run the regressions
excluding the participants belonging to the group that end up
last in each round. Our motivation for this robustness check is
twofold: to check that the nonlinearities are not driven by sub-
jects in groups that ranked last, who might be different from
the other participants; and to exclude from the subsample the
subjects with perfect correlation between individual and group
ranking given their null payoff under competition. The nonlinear
effect of group ranking is no longer significant under pseudo-
competition, whereas the coefficients increase in magnitude under
competition. This result suggests that the incentivized inter-group
8In theory, the variable Contribution is subject to a truncation problem as it
is bounded between −10 and 10. In practice, less than 2% of the observations
are located in any of these extreme values of Contribution. This is true for
the pseudocompetition and the competition treatments.
competition induces more responsiveness to the social compari-
son, if compared to the pseudocompetition.
The predicted response Contribution for each combination
of group and individual ranking is plotted in Figure 4. The same
pattern is observed across treatments: high individual perfor-
mance and low group performance are followed by an increase in
contributions. The stark difference is a positive shift in the inter-
cept once group competition is materially incentivized. Under
competition the individual contribution is slightly reduced only
in case of a high group ranking (at least 5) and a low individ-
ual ranking (at most 4). This reaction could be interpreted as a
reciprocal response to the environmental cues suggesting higher
contributions with respect to the other team members.
We perform three robustness checks to the regressions shown
in Table 2. The results are reported in the online Supplementary
Material. First, we show that all the coefficients are statistically
different between treatments (see Table B.1 in Supplementary
Material). Second, we compute again the regressions excluding
the observations in which subjects were playing the NE, i.e.,
those constrained to alter their extraction level. As shown in
Supplementary Material (Table B.2) our estimates are robust in
the competition stage, although the quadratic effect of group
ranking disappears under pseudocompetition. Third, we run the
regression separately for each group size. The coefficients are
reported in Supplementary Material (Table B.3). The marginally
decreasing (increasing) effect of group (individual) ranking is
captured in the regression for each subsample, but the statistical
significance of the coefficients is compromised due to our loss of
statistical power. This problem is particularly stark in the pseudo-
competition stage for all group sizes, and in the competition stage
for the smaller group size.
The differences in within-ranking variance between stages
described in pattern (iii) were tested statistically (see Table
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A B C D
FIGURE 3 | Changes in contribution with respect to relative
performance. (A,B) show the negative effect of group ranking in
Contribution for the pseudocompetition and competition stages,
respectively. (C,D) show the positive effect of individual ranking in
Contribution for the pseudocompetition and competition stages,
respectively. For treatments with 18 and 24 participants the individual
ranking was rescaled to match the treatment with 30 participants. In (C,D)
subjects in the worst performing group are excluded given their null payoff,
leading to a large number of ties at the bottom of individual ranking. Fitted
values refer to a quadratic regression in which the independent variables
are the respective ranking (group or individual) and its square, and the
dependent variable is Contribution.
B.4 in the online Supplementary Material). The variance in
Contribution decreases under competition when the group or
the individual ranking increases, whereas the variance remains
relatively constant under pseudocompetition.
4. DISCUSSION
We propose a VCM game in which the introduction of incen-
tivized between-group competition alters the Nash equilibrium
of the game from null contribution to full contribution. This
manipulation drastically increases within-group cooperation, as
reported by others where competition induced higher contri-
butions in equilibrium (Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport, 2006;
Reuben and Tyran, 2010). Regarding the responses to feedback,
the negative effect of group ranking (particularly under pseudo-
competition) is similar to the findings in Tan and Bolle (2007),
in which members from the winning (resp. losing) group tend to
decrease (resp. increase) their contribution level.
The distance to the equilibrium prediction in the pseudo-
competition stage has been explained by conditional cooperation
(Chaudhuri, 2011), the intention to establish efficiency enhanc-
ing norms (Andreoni, 1988) and bounded rationality (Ledyard,
1995; Kummerli et al., 2010). However, only the latter explanation
can be successfully extrapolated to the analysis of the competition
stage. We consider four non mutually exclusive explanations for
this behavior. First, subjects might be following the asymmet-
ric equilibria aforementioned. Remember that if subjects con-
sider that not all groups are equally competitive they may have
incentives to set their contribution levels below the NE. This
is very plausible since players are getting information in each
round about their individual and group performance. Further,
(Markussen et al., 2014) provide evidence of subjects correctly
expecting that their group was likely to be outcompeted (and
therefore they voted against introducing competition). Assuming
that subjects in our experiment were able to form similar expec-
tations based on their past interactions, one should expect more
diverse responses among those subjects in groups ranked last in
the previous round. The decreasing variance of Contribution
with group ranking provides evidence in favor of this behavior.
A second explanation is that subjects might be confused due
to the complexity of a simultaneous computation of in-group
and out-group beliefs when subjects know that the groups are
not equally good in the competition. If this is the case, subjects
may develop rules of thumb based on the logic of the asymmetric
equilibrium described above: subjects might underestimate the
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FIGURE 4 | Predicted change in contribution as a function of group and
individual performance. The left and right panels correspond to the
predicted difference in contribution under pseudocompetition and
competition using results from columns (1) and (3) in Table 2, respectively.
Red (resp. blue) bars correspond to a positive (negative) value of
Contribution.
Table 2 | Fixed effects regression: Contribution explained by individual and group rankings.
Dependent variable: Pseudocompetition Competition
 Contribution (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged group ranking −1.045*** −0.661** −6.912*** −9.666***
(0.106) (0.244) (1.012) (0.934)
Lagged group ranking squared 0.039*** −0.008 0.481*** 0.765***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.112) (0.108)
Lagged individual ranking 0.429*** 0.408*** 1.405*** 1.738***
(0.053) (0.059) (0.188) (0.173)
Lagged individual ranking squared −0.006** −0.005** −0.023*** −0.029***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Round −0.013 −0.019 −0.089*** −0.083**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.028)
Constant −1.998*** −2.453** 2.215*** 4.643***
(0.490) (0.810) (0.448) (0.388)
Group ranked at bottom excluded No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,296 1,101 1,296 1,101
R-squared 0.400 0.402 0.153 0.228
Number of subjects 144 144 144 144
Standard errors were computed clustering observations at the session level. For treatments with 18 and 24 participants the individual ranking was rescaled to match
the treatment with 30 participants. The Round variable goes from 2 to 10 in all regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05.
probability that their group will be reached by a group posi-
tioned below, and therefore they may opt for not contributing
all their endowment. A decrease in the degree of confusion
(possibly through a learning process) fits the increasing ten-
dency of contributions over time observed in the competition
stage.
A third possibility is that subjects are indirectly punishing low
contributors in their group through a reduction in their contri-
bution level9. We test econometrically the existence of reciprocal
9This a standard explanation for the decay of contributions in standard public
goods games that is related to other-regarding preferences.
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behavior by regressing Contribution on the lagged average con-
tribution from the other group members (results not shown).
We limit our sample to those cases in which player i was con-
tributing more than the average of her fellow group members
(i.e., those in position to punish low contributors). We find that
higher contributions from other group members increase contri-
butions under competition. This is true for the full sample and
for the subsample of top performing groups (ranked 4–6), but
not for the subsample of bottom performing groups (ranked
1–3). Nonetheless, as the coefficient is only significant for the
full sample, the punishment-based explanation is not entirely
convincing.
One may think of an additional explanation based on the
previous history of decay under pseudocompetition. Although
we cannot test this hypothesis because all subjects faced both
treatments in the same order, we argue that the history of the
game is not very likely to explain the underinvestment in the
common fund for two reasons. First, previous experiments did
not find any order effect (Burton-Chellew et al., 2010; Burton-
Chellew and West, 2012), or the effect implies that subjects
contribute more under between-group competition when it is
preceded by a control stage without competition (Puurtinen and
Mappes, 2009). Second, as is shown in Figure 2 the relationship
between the contribution with and without competition for a
given player is U-shaped rather than monotonic. Therefore, it is
hard to think about an unequivocal effect of previous cooperative
decay.
We conclude highlighting the important role of the feedback
of individual and group performance on future contributions. In
particular, we want to stress that subjects are decreasing (resp.
increasing) their contribution levels in response to high group
(resp. individual) ranking, independently of the presence of mate-
rial incentives to compete. The additional rewards (and penalties)
incentivizing competition raise the average contribution levels,
but they do not seem to alter the structural reaction to the envi-
ronmental cues from relative performance. If we consider the
complexity of updating beliefs at the in-group and out-group
levels simultaneously, the similarities across treatments (despite
the different NE) found in this work suggest the use of rules of
thumb to process the type of information that triggers compe-
tition through social comparison. Given our conjecture about
the importance of preferences for performing in a competitive
environment in explaining the deviations from the equilibrium
strategy, and the evidence on voting against competition found
in Markussen et al. (2014), future research could involve cross-
cultural differences in these preferences to test the reactiveness to
the cues of competition, or manipulations in framings to evaluate
the responsiveness to the incentives to compete and the incentives
to cooperate.
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